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Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market
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7.29
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102.50

102.50

82.50

102.50

87.50

117.50

136.50

141.50

44.00

44.00

48.75

A number of environmental problems are international in nature, including many water management
issues. Rivers, for example, do not recognize political
boundaries. Therefore, pollution generated in one
country can affect neighboring countries, while water extraction in an upstream country can affect water flow and water availability in a downstream
country. The situation creates an interdependency
among countries, which might lead to disputes over
the management of transboundary water. Therefore,
coordination among the countries is necessary for
effective management of these transboundary resources.
The focus of a recently published study
(Khachaturyan and Schoengold, 2018) is the transboundary Kura-Araks Basin (see Figure 1 for its location), which is a major river system in the South
Caucasus, with about 11 million people living in the
basin. The countries in the basin are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, and Turkey, with Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia having over 80 percent of
the streamflow. The Kura-Araks Basin is a primary
source of water for agricultural, industrial, and municipal uses in the South Caucasian countries. The
study determines whether there are economic benefits to be gained from cooperation in the management of the Kura River (shared between Azerbaijan
and Georgia), and under what conditions cooperation is an achievable outcome. Azerbaijan withdraws
about 35 percent of the total available renewable water resources while Georgia only withdraws about 3
percent.
The development and expansion of irrigated agriculture increased water use in the Kura River Basin of
Azerbaijan. The reductions of natural flow, caused
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FIGURE 1. The Kura-Araks Basin in the Caucasian countries.

Isolated Negotiations: Water Quantity

As the upstream riparian, Georgia is wellpositioned to provide more water to Azerbaijan.
While its total and per-capita water withdrawals are
lower than Azerbaijan, it has almost twice the estimated renewable water available. More water will
allow Azerbaijan to expand both its agriculture and
industry sectors, and will allow some diversification
beyond the energy industry. Given Azerbaijan’s
downstream position and dependency on Georgia
to receive a continuous and sufficient flow of water,
Azerbaijan needs to offer something attractive to
Georgia in return for such flow. With more economic resources due to its status as an energy exporter, Azerbaijan has the economic resources to
provide better irrigation technology that can increase water use efficiency in Georgia. Due to the
Source: Vener and Campana (2010), the basin is enclosed in blue line. higher cost of drip irrigation, we focus on a switch
from flood to sprinkler irrigation, which has an avby overuse of some rivers, worsen the conditions in the baerage efficiency improvement of 20 percent.
sin. In addition to water quantity, water quality is also of
Azerbaijan has two strategies to provide efficient water
significant concern in the region. Water quality degradause technology (e.g., drip irrigation) to save water or
tion occurs from a variety of sources, including municipal
not: technology or no technology. Providing technoloand industrial wastewater, extensive use of pesticides and
gy means providing financial and technical assistance
fertilizers in agriculture, and wastewater from mining activin order to increase the efficiency of water use in Georities. Given the existing challenges for water management
gia. Georgia has two strategies: more water or less wain the basin, it is important to evaluate the feasibility of coter. An agreement between the two countries will specify
operation between the countries to improve outcomes.
the technology investment supplied by Azerbaijan and
Game theory offers a powerful set of tools that can be used
the amount of water supplied by Georgia.
to analyze economic and political incentives for cooperaThe payoffs associated with this agreement are in Table
tion, the strategies of the parties involved, and the possible
1. Each cell has two values, the first corresponding to
outcomes in various strategic contexts, including transAzerbaijan’s payoff and the second to Georgia’s payoff.
boundary resources. Therefore, it is frequently used to anaThe cell with strategies no technology and less water is
lyze international agreements. Linking issues can help
the status quo situation. The payoff (0, 0) is used for the
achieve cooperation and build trust, since a country that
status quo to provide a baseline for comparison with
benefits from cheating on one issue may cooperate when
alternative agreements. Technology and more water is
another country can credibly cheat on another issue in rethe cooperative outcome with an associated payoff of
taliation.
(15.22, 1.04) (payoffs are measured in billions of dolGeorgia and Azerbaijan have an upstream-downstream
lars). However, strategies no technology and less water
relationship. Hence, actions taken by Georgia, the upis the predicted outcome, since each country has an
stream riparian, have an effect on Azerbaijan, the downincentive to cheat (and earn more money) with the costream riparian. However, for cooperation to occur, there
operative result.
need to be benefits of cooperation for both countries. To
Isolated Negotiations: Water Quality
design an effective treaty that is relevant to policy-makers
and negotiators, we need to first identify the strength of
The Kura River is polluted in the industrial part of easteach player. In the current analysis, the strength for Georern Georgia from industrial and domestic untreated
gia is defined to be a large amount of water and its upwaste. Much of the nation is served by wastewater
stream position (as Azerbaijan is dependent on its uptreatment plants that were installed during the Soviet
stream neighbor for both quality and quality of waters enera. Many of those plants do not work, or only provide
tering its territory), while the strength of Azerbaijan is
basic treatment. Given the high dependence of Azergreater economic resources and large amounts of oil and
baijan on Georgia for water resources, water pollution
natural gas resources. The analysis will consider water
problems in Azerbaijan are primarily the result of upquantity and water quality, as both are critical issues in the
stream agricultural and industrial activity combined
region.

with poor treatment facilities. Construction of water filter
treatment plants would improve water quality in both
Georgia and in Azerbaijan, leading to health benefits. Diarrhea is one of the main diseases caused by contaminated
water. The death rate of diarrheal diseases in 2008 was 9.5
and 3 per 100,000 people for Azerbaijan and Georgia, respectively. In contrast, death rates in some countries with
high quality water are the following: USA 1.2, Canada 1.6,
Netherlands 0.5, France 0.9, Germany 0.6, Sweden 0.5, and
Norway 2. If Georgia builds or renovates the treatment facilities, water pollution will decrease and diseases caused by
contaminated water will decrease as well.
In contrast to the water quantity game, where the upstream
country (Georgia) incurs the cost in order to benefit the
downstream country (Azerbaijan), improving water quality
in Georgia provides benefits in both countries. But, it is unrealistic for Georgia to make the costly investment in water
treatment on its own. Georgia has fewer economic resources to pay for improving treatment facilities. In 2016,
per-capita GDP in Azerbaijan and Georgia were $17,400
and $10,000, respectively. In addition, the rate of waterborne disease is higher in Azerbaijan; thus, it suffers more
from the polluted water than Georgia does. Finally, poor
water quality and poorly maintained treatment facilities
have been common in Georgia for years, and politicians
have not yet responded to the pollution. Thus, Azerbaijan
must provide some additional benefit to Georgia for improving water quality. As a significant exporter of natural
gas, Azerbaijan can provide a discount on a portion of
Georgia’s natural gas imports.
Azerbaijan has two strategies: to provide natural gas to
Georgia for a reduced price or not: cheaper gas or no cheaper gas. Georgia used to buy gas from Russia, but since 2006
has purchased Azerbaijani gas diversifying its importers. In
2016, Georgia imported approximately 90 percent of its natural gas from Azerbaijan and only about 10 percent from
Russia. The strategy cheaper gas means selling natural gas at
a discount relative to current prices. Georgia has two strategies: to invest in pollution reduction technology to provide
cleaner water to Azerbaijan or not: clean water or not clean
water. It is costly to clean water, since water is heavily polluted from industrial, municipal, and agricultural uses. This
game is presented in Table 1. The cell with the strategies no
cheaper gas and no clean water is the status quo situation.
Issue Linkage and the Interconnected Games: The interconnected game is presented in Table 2. With the interconnected game, each country has four possible strategies. The
countries can choose to cooperate on both issues, not to
cooperate on both issues, or to cooperate on only one issue.
The first number in the cell represents a payoff for Azerbaijan as a result of Azerbaijan’s and Georgian’s strategies. For
example, the payoff in the first upper cell is (17.01, 1.505).
This outcome, which is the fully cooperative one, corres-

ponds to Azerbaijan choosing technology and Georgia
choosing more water in the water quantity game, with
the result being (15.215, 1.04) payoff, and Azerbaijan
choosing cheaper gas and Georgia choosing clean water in the water quality game, with the result being
(1.795, 0.465) payoff. The payoff in the cell corresponding to the third row and fourth column is (0.325, 4.28). This payoff corresponds to Azerbaijan
choosing technology and Georgia choosing less water
in the water quantity game, and Azerbaijan choosing
no cheaper gas and Georgia choosing no clean water in
water quality game with the result being (0, 0) noncooperative outcome.
Results: Our results show that interconnected games
are welfare improving because they ensure that the
cooperative outcome is incentive compatible (i.e.,
achievable). Intuitively, this result occurs because one
country has a highly dominant strategy in one game,
while the other has a highly dominant strategy in the
other. Since each game requires a fixed investment as a
strategy for one country, and a repeated benefit for the
other country, full cooperation is not achievable in
either independent game, since each country has an
incentive to cheat in one game. Thus, while linking
issues does not expand the set of economic outcomes,
it assures that each country has the fully cooperative
outcome instead of the status quo (no agreement). The
political feasibility of our results, which is crucial to
policymakers who may want to use these issues as a
starting point for negotiations, are reasonable in comparison to each nation’s economy. The estimated values show a greater gain to Azerbaijan from cooperation than to Georgia ($17.01 billion versus $1.51 billion). However, these values are much closer when
examined relative to each country’s GDP. Since Georgia’s GDP is approximately one-fifth of Azerbaijan’s
GDP, these values represent about 20 and 9 percent of
GDP for Azerbaijan and Georgia, respectively. Since
the payoffs are calculated as the net present value of a
stream of future benefits, the annual benefit as a percent of GDP is lower (about 1 to 2 percent). Thus, the
results are reasonable, since the benefits are large
enough to be of relevance to national policymakers,
but not so large to be unrealistic. This information can
be useful for policymakers when considering potential
negotiation on transboundary waters between the
countries, without the use of direct financial transfers.

TABLE 1. Payoffs in Isolated Negotiations between Azerbaijan and Georgia: Parameter Values
Georgia (upstream)
Parameter Values (Billions of Dollars)
Water Quantity Strategies
Azerbaijan
(downstream)

More water

Less water

Technology

15.22

1.04

-0.33

4.28

No technology

15.54

-3.24

0

0

Water Quality Strategies

Clean water

No clean water

Cheaper gas

1.80

0.47

-0.30

0.30

No cheaper gas

2.10

0.17

0

0

Note: Parameter values are based on secondary data about the value of water consumption, the cost of improved irrigation technology, the value of health impacts from poor water quality, water treatment costs, and the use of natural gas in
Azerbaijan and Georgia

TABLE 2. Interconnected game for water quantity and water quality between Azerbaijan and Georgia: Parameter
Values.
Georgia (upstream)

Strategies
Azerbaijan
(downstream)

More water
Clean water

Parameter Values (Billions of Dollars)
Less water
More water
Less water
Clean water
No clean water
No clean water

Technology
Cheaper gas

17.01

1.51

1.47

4.75

14.92

1.34

-0.63

4.58

No Technology

17.34

-2.78

1.80

0.47

15.24

-2.94

-0.30

0.30

Technology

17.31

1.21

1.77

4.45

15.22

1.04

-0.33

4.28

No technology

17.64

-3.08

2.10

0.17

15.54

-3.24

0.00

0.00

Note: Parameter values are based on secondary data about the value of water consumption, the cost of improved irrigation technology, the value of health impacts from poor water quality, water treatment costs, and the use of natural gas in Azerbaijan and Georgia.
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